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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL MARIJUANA STATUTES-
AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL OF CRIMINAL
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
On December 22, 1965, Dr. Timothy Leary of LSD infamy, his son
and daughter, and two others travelled by automobile across the Interna-
tional Bridge at Laredo, Texas, enroute to Yucatan, Mexico. Having been
denied admission at the Mexican customs station, they drove back across
the bridge to the American secondary inspection area where they were
detained by a customs inspector. Upon an examination of the interior of
the automobile, the inspector discovered what he believed to be marijuana
seeds on the floor. A more thorough search of the car and its passengers
revealed small amounts of marijuana in the car and about one-half ounce
of marijuana in Leary's daughter's possession. Leary was indicted on three
counts: (1) knowingly smuggling marijuana into the United States;'
(2) transporting or concealing marijuana on which a transfer tax had not
been paid; 2 and (3) knowingly transporting or facilitating the transporta-
tion or concealment of marijuana which had been illegally imported.8
At his trial in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, the defendant was convicted on the "transfer tax" and "transporta-
tion" counts, and sentenced to the maximum punishment.4 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction on both counts,5
and subsequently denied defendant's petition for a rehearing.6  The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two constitu-
tional aspects of federal marijuana statutes. First, did the requirement
that defendant pay a transfer tax on marijuana violate his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self incrimination?7 Second, was defendant denied
due process of law by operation of the presumption of 21 U.S.C. § 176a
which provides that from defendant's unexplained possession of marijuana,
illegal importation of the marijuana and defendant's knowlege of such
importation may be presumed? Justice Harlan, writing for the Court ma-
jority, answered in the affirmative to both questions and reversed both
1. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 4744 (1964).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
4. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 854 (5th Cir. 1967). The "smug-
gling" count was dismissed at the trial.
5. Id. at 870.
6. Leary v. United States, 392 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1968).
7. For treatment of the expanding fifth amendment privilege foreshadowing
Leary, see Note, 18 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 296 (1968).
[Vol. XIX
counts of defendant's conviction. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969).
This case note shall be restricted solely to the aspect of criminal stat-
utory presumptions-their nature, purpose, and constitutional require-
ments. The line of cases leading to the Leary decision will also be ana-
lyzed, and the impact of this decision on the future will be briefly ex-
plored.
An aura of confusion has long surrounded the concept of presumptions,
a term for which the courts and legal scholars have had many varied
interpretations." The efforts of the courts in administering statutory pre-
sumptions are further confounded by the failure of legislatures to specify
the procedural effect of a presumption. 9 However, after eliminating any
nuances in meaning, it is clear that all definitions of presumptions contain
at least two common elements: a fact to be proved and a fact to be pre-
sumed. By operation of a rule of law, when a certain fact is proved, the
trier of fact is permitted or required to presume the existence of another
fact. 10 For example, if a defendant's unexplained presence at a still (fact
to be proved) is established, then the jury may infer that he is "carrying
on" the business of a distiller (fact to be presumed). 1
Criminal statutory presumptions are a valuable aid to the prosecution in
securing a conviction, particularly when difficult-to-prove facts, such as
the mental state of a defendant, may be presumed. 12 Thus, through the
benefit of a presumption, a district attorney will be allowed to adduce a
smaller quantum of evidence to convict the defendant. 13 Further, when
the court's instruction to the jury includes reference to the presumption,
the jury will probably be more willing to convict than in the absence of
such a presumption.' 4 It is well established that the enactment of a stat-
utory presumption is within the general power of a legislature to provide
rules of evidence; 5 however, the power to create presumptions is not with-
out limit. A statutory presumption must operate within the bounds of the
Constitution or be invalid. An analysis of the chain of cases leading to the
8. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 306 (1942); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
308 (1954).
9. Note, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 141 (1966).
10. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 78 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
11. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5601(a)(4), 5601(b)(2) (1964).
12. Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14
A.B.A.J. 287 (1928).
13. Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REV. 178, 203 (1931),
14. Id. at 204.
15. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42 (1910).
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Leary decision reveals the attempts which the Supreme Court has made to
establish criteria by which the constitutionality of various statutory pre-
sumptions can be gauged.
One such guideline was advanced by Justice Holmes in Ferry v. Ram-
sey,' a civil case in which a bank director was sued for assenting to the
receipt of deposits after he had knowledge of the bank's insolvency. A
Kansas statute specified that the fact of insolvency shall be prima facie
evidence of the director's knowledge of the insolvency and his assent to
the deposit.' 7 Holmes concluded that this presumption is valid because the
Kansas legislature could have passed a law making a bank director per-
sonally liable without any knowledge or assent on his part. Thus, the in-
quiry necessitated by Holmes' formula is whether the proved fact itself
could have been made illegal without use of the presumed fact; if so, the
presumption is valid.
The Court applied a second test in Morrison v. California,18 a criminal
case in which an alien and a citizen had been convicted of conspiring to
violate the Alien Land Law of California.'9 This statute included a pre-
sumption which provided that if a defendant had been using or occupying
real property and was of a race ineligible for citizenship (e.g., Japanese),
then he was presumed not to be a citizen; the burden of proving citizen-
ship was on the defendants. In applying the "comparative convenience"
test, the Court considered whether the defendant or the prosecution would
be better able to present evidence as to the presumed fact. The deter-
mination was made that the prosecution would be in a better position to ad-
duce such evidence because the procedural convenience of shifting the bur-
den of proof to the defendants was outweighed by the probability of in-
justice to them.20 On this basis the statute was invalidated. Thus, the
''comparative convenience" test takes into account the nature of the fact
to be proved, the party better able to prove the fact, and whether injustice
would result from a shift in the burden of proof.
The third and most significant test was of civil origin in Mobile, Jackson
& Kansas City R. R. v. Turnipseed,2 1 an action by an administrator of an
estate for the wrongful death of a servant of the railroad. Through the
16. 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
17. Laws of Kansas of 1879, ch. 48, § 1 (repealed 1947).
18. 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
19. California Statutes of 1927, ch. 528, § 9a. This statute was declared un-
constitutional in Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), and
Haruye Masaoka v. California, 39 Cal. 2d 883, 245 P.2d 1062 (1952).
20. Morrison v. California, supra note 18, at 94.
21. Supra note 15.
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operation of a Mississippi statute, 22 negligence on the part of a defendant
railroad was presumed in all cases in which injury was inflicted by the
running of locomotives. In upholding the constitutionality of the pre-
sumption, Justice Lurton declared:
That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another not constitute
a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law
it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed.23
Through subsequent application, the "rational connection" test attained
prominence, 24 and in Tot v. United States2 5 the Court established it as the
sole criterion to measure the constitutionality of presumptions. Defend-
ant Tot had been convicted of violating the Federal Firearms Act 20 which
prohibited any person who was convicted of a crime of violence or who
was a fugitive from justice from obtaining a firearm shipped through
interstate commerce. From the mere fact of possession of a firearm, the
statute permitted an inference that it was obtained through interstate com-
merce. The prosecution argued that the presumption was valid because
it met the requirements of the "Holmes" test-that is, because Congress
could have proscribed possession of all firearms by persons previously
convicted of crimes of violence. The Court answered by stating that
Congress did not choose to make all gun aquisitions by such persons
illegal. 27 By discounting the relevance of what Congress could have done,
the Court rejected any application of the "Holmes" test. Also dismissed
was the government's contention that the "rational connection" and "com-
parative convenience" tests are alternative means of assaying the validity
of criminal presumptions. The Court concluded that "these are not inde-
pendent tests . . . . [T]he first is controlling and the second but a
corollary. '28  The argument for "comparative convenience" is valid only
when the requirements of the "rational connection" test have already been
met.
22. Miss. CODE § 1985 (1906), as amended Miss. CODE ANN. § 1741 (1942).
23. Supra note 15, at 43.
24. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), in which the Court men-
tioned this test but based its decision on the thirteenth amendment; Lindsley v.
National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); McFarland v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929); West-
ern & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929); Morrison v. California,
supra note 18, in which the "rational connection" test was mentioned, but the
decision was based on "comparative convenience."
25. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1964).
27. Tot v. United States, supra note 25, at 472.
28. Tot v. United States, supra note 25, at 467.
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What are the requirements of the "rational connection" test? Until the
Leary decision the Court spoke in vague and extremely subjective terms of
the application of this criterion. The relationship between the fact to be
proved and the fact to be presumed must not be "arbitrary," 2 "unreason-
able,"80 or "strained."'" There must be a connection "between the two
[facts] in common experience. '3 2 Such connection must not be "too
tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt.""3  In examining a
presumption "significant weight should be accorded to the capacity of
Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from
it."'8 4 Couched in these terms the "rational connection" test rests almost
entirely on the subjective reasoning process of an individual judge. More-
over, this language fails to take into account the real factor which imparts
to a presumption its rationality-the degree of probability that the fact to
be presumed is likely to follow the fact to be proved.
To illustrate the role that probability plays in determining the validity of
criminal presumptions, two recent decisions, United States v. Gainey35 and
United States v. Romano,3 ° will be analyzed. The defendants in both
cases were arrested in the presence of stills and charged with violating
similar sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Gainey was convicted of
"carrying on" the business of a distiller,37 whereas Romano was convicted
of having possession, custody, or control of a still.38 In noting the stealth
employed in the use of an illegal distillery, the Court determined that
"anyone present at the site is probably connected with the illegal enter-
prise,"' 9 and affirmed the conviction of Romano. The presumption that
Gainey was "carrying on" the business of a still was valid because it "did
no more than 'accord to the evidence, if unexplained, its natural probative
force.' "40 The Court distinguished its decision in Gainey from that in
Romano in that the crime of "carrying on" the business of a still is much
29. Supra note 15, at 43.
30. Supra note 15, at 43.
31. Tot v. United States, supra note 25, at 468; United States v. Romano, 382
U.S. 136, 139 (1965).
32. Tot v. United States, supra note 25, at 468.
33. United States v. Romano, supra note 31, at 141.
34. Supra note 10, at 67.
35. Supra note 10, at 67.
36. United States v. Romano, supra note 31.
37. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5601(a)(4), 5601(b)(2) (1964).
38. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5601(a)(1), 5601(b)(1) (1964).
39. United States v. Romano, supra note 31, at 141.
40. Supra note 10, at 71.
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broader than the crime of having possession of a still. 41 The Gainey con-
viction was reversed, and the presumption was found invalid because the
relationship between presence (the fact to be proved) and possession (the
fact to be presumed) "is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of
guilt .... *42 Romano could well have been involved in a function such
as supply or delivery, which is in no way related to the possession of a still.
The differing results in these two cases is founded solely on probability-
the likelihood that the presumed fact will exist if the proved fact exists.
It is "very probable" that anyone present at a still is "carrying on" the
business of a still; on the other hand, it is not as likely that one present
will have possession of the still. Thus, the "rational connection" test and
its language of "arbitrary," "unreasonable," and "tenuous" may be reduced
to one underlying factor-probability.
The question which naturally arises is: What is the requisite degree of
probability for a valid presumption? The Court in Leary for the first time
took cognizance of this problem and in so doing added a new objectivity
to the "rational connection" test.
Leary had been charged with receiving, concealing, buying, selling, or
in any manner facilitating "the transportation, concealment, or sale of
such marijuana after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to
be imported or brought into the United States contrary to law . . .,4s
The presumption on which this case centers provided:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant is shown to have
or to have had the marijuana in his possession, such possession shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains his posses-
sion to the satisfaction of the jury. 44
The Court construed this presumption as authorizing the jury to infer from
the defendant's possession two necessary elements of the offense: (1)
the illegal importation of the marijuana, and (2) defendant's knowledge
of such importation. 45  An examination of this presumption was made
within the framework of a refined "rational connection" criterion, as enun-
ciated by Justice Harlan:
[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary,"
and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which
it is made to depend.46
41. United States v. Romano, supra note 31, at 140.
42. United States v. Romano, supra note 31, at 141.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
45. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 37 (1969).
46. Id. at 36.
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Applying this test, the Court concluded that the inference as to Leary's
knowledge of the illegal importation impinged upon his constitutional
rights; the question raised by the inference of illegal importation was not
reached by the Court.
As a natural consequence of this holding, the constitutionality of criminal
presumptions must henceforth be determined by a more scientific, em-
pirical approach. The emphasis of the "rational connection" test has
shifted from the subjective opinion of a judge to the objectivity of external
reality. Deference must of course be accorded to the ability of Congress
to perceive reality; however, in Leary the Court found the legislative his-
tory of §176a "inadequate," and ignored it. 47  Thus, in viewing the
presumptions for the first time from an empirical standpoint,48 the Court
undertook the incongruous task of determining the proclivities of "pot"
smokers by "canvass[ing] the available, pertinent data. '41' Research into
House and Senate committee hearings, government reports, books, and
periodicals indicated to the Court that most marijuana is of foreign origin.50
However, that information does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
a majority of marijuana users know that their marijuana was imported.
The Court hypothesized that there are five ways in which a smoker might
know of its foreign origin: (1) by his knowledge of the proportion of
marijuana smuggled into the country; (2) by his actions if he is the
smuggler; (3) by his indirect knowledge of the source of his supply; (4)
by his specification to his supplier that the marijuana be imported; or (5)
by his ability to detect imported marijuana by its characteristics.r 1  In
considering each of these possibilities, the Court found itself unable to con-
clude that the majority of marijuana smokers know that their marijuana
was imported. The presumption as to the knowledge of importation was,
therefore, constitutionally infirm since it could not be established that
possessors of marijuana are "more likely than not" to know of its origin.
Justice Black concurred in the opinion of the Court on the basis of
what may be called a fourth criterion for presumptions. The "Black"
test, first elucidated in Gainey, regards a "rational connection" as "only
the first hurdle" for a criminal presumption. 52  Even if a presumption is
reasonable, it must not operate to deprive a defendant of any constitu-
47. Id. at 38.
48. Although an empirical approach was first suggested in United States v.
Gainey, supra note 10, at 67, the Gainey Court failed to follow through on its sug-
gestion.
49. Supra note 45, at 38.
50. Supra note 45, at 41.
51. Supra note 45, at 47.
52. Supra note 10, at 80 (dissenting opinion).
tional right. Thus, in the eyes of Justice Black, a "rational connection"
is not conclusive of constitutionality; a legislatively created presumption
is valid only if it does not encroach upon a defendant's constitutional
rights. Via this approach, the determination was made that the defendant
Leary had been denied his rights under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments as well as Article III of the Constitution.53 Justice Black's
constitutional objections may be reduced to three basic arguments: (1)
Congress has no power to instruct a jury as to what amount of evidence is
sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and any such attempt by
Congress in the form of a statutory presumption is a violation of the separa-
tion of the powers of government; 54 (2) a criminal statutory presump-
tion deprives a defendant of his right to trial by jury; 5 (3) a criminal
presumption compels a defendant to be a witness against himself in viola-
tion of his fifth amendment privilege. 56
These same three constitutional objections may be raised against all
criminal statutory presumptions which exist for the benefit of the prose-
cution. Hence, the "Black" test may be translated into this simplistic for-
mula: "If it's a criminal statutory presumption, it's unconstitutional." The
ineluctable result of the "Black" test would be that in all criminal proceed-
ings the only permissible presumption would be of innocence until proven
guilty.57
Besides failing to answer Justice Black's challenges, the Leary Court
did not reach the significant question of whether a criminal presumption
must satisfy the "reasonable doubt" standard.58 Instead the Court adopted
the less restrictive "more likely than not" standard, and invalidated the
marijuana presumption on that basis. In accordance with this standard,
a criminal presumption is valid if the statistical chance of the presumed fact
following the proved fact is greater than fifty per cent ("more likely than
not"). Situations may be visualized in which this standard clearly con-
flicts with the principle that a defendant must be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and that each and every element of his crime must be
so proved.59 For example, assume the existence of a criminal presump-
53. Supra note 45, at 56 (concurring opinion).
54. Supra note 10, at 88 (dissenting opinion); supra note 45, at 55 (concurring
opinion).
55. Tot v. United States, supra note 25, at 473 (concurring opinion); supra note
10, at 87 (dissenting opinion); supra note 45, at 55, 56 (concurring opinion).
56. Supra note 10, at 87 (dissenting opinion); supra note 45, at 56 (concurring
opinion).
57. Supra note 10, at 85 (dissenting opinion).
58. Supra note 45, at 36 n.64.
59. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 321.
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tion for which the presumed fact follows the proved fact fifty-one per cent
of the time, and which, therefore, is valid under the "rational connection"
test. Assume also that the accused is in fact innocent but remains silent
in exercise of his fifth amendment privilege. Under these circumstances,
the jury, acting in accordance with the criminal presumption, would be
authorized to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet,
is not forty-nine per cent more than a reasonable doubt?
Although the Leary Court did not deal with this problem, the Gainey
Court attempted to reconcile "reasonable doubt" with criminal presump-
tions. The presumption in Gainey as construed by Justice Stewart and
the majority does not require the jury to convict the defendant in all cases;
it merely authorizes such conviction if the jury finds the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.60 Nor does the presumption require the judge
to submit the case to the jury in all cases; it merely permits him to do so if
he finds the evidence sufficient."' Thus, the construction given to the
presumption in Gainey indicates that criminal statutory presumptions
should be "permissive" rather than "mandatory. '62 With a "permissive"
type of presumption, the Court in Gainey felt that a jury may be satis-
factorily instructed as to "reasonable doubt."' 63  In his dissent in Gainey,
Justice Black regarded this interpretation as "almost self-contradictory '64
-that is, to hold that although a statute is valid, both judge and jury may
ignore it if they choose.
Dr. Timothy Leary's case, though causing more than a minor change in
federal mairjuana laws, will probably be neither a boon to the drug cul-
ture nor an impediment to effective drug control. The presumption of 21
U.S.C. § 176a was invalidated only to the extent of the inference of de-
fendant's knowledge of illegal importation of marijuana; the inference of
illegal importation remains intact. 65 Thus, the government will still prose-
cute under this statute if there exists "sufficient direct or circumstantial
evidence that defendant knew of the importation. ' 66  If evidence of
such knowledge is lacking, the charge will be dismissed, and the case
will be referred to local authorities for prosecution.67  Through this pro-
cedure the Department of Justice can effectively adapt its manpower to
60. Supra note 10, at 70.
61. Supra note 10, at 68.
62. The distinction between "mandatory" and "permissive" presumptions is
drawn by MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 308.
63. Supra note 10.
64. Supra note 10, at 76 (dissenting opinion).
65. Supra note 45, at 37.
66. Dept. of Justice, Memorandum 630, at 6 (1969).
67. Id. at 7.
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the new marijuana statutory scheme.68  Moreover, the Court explicitly
stated that the Leary decision is no bar to the enactment of future mari-
juana laws by Congress.6 11
As a result of the Leary case, other criminal statutory presumptions
will no doubt come under the scrutiny of the courts. The presumption,
for example, of federal narcotics statute 21 U.S.C. § 174, identical almost
word for word with the Leary presumption, will probably be reexamined
in the light of the new "rational connection" test. Merely because it
could not be established that the majority of marijuana smokers know the
origin of their marijuana, it does not necessarily follow that the majority of
"hard" narcotics users do not know the origin of their drug. In surveying
data relevant to narcotic drugs, the courts may well conclude that drug
users are "more likely than not" to have knowledge of its importation,
and uphold the validity of that presumption.
In judging the constitutionality of criminal statutory presumptions in the
future, the following salient points, extracted from Leary and other
decisions, should be considered: (1) There must be a rational connection
between the fact presumed and the fact proved; (2) The connection is
rational if the presumed fact follows the proved fact more than fifty per
cent of the time; (3) An empirical approach must be taken to determine
whether this relationship exists in fact; (4) Some deference should be paid
to the capacity of Congress to judge the rationality of the connection; and
(5) The presumption should be "permissive" rather than "mandatory" so
that a jury may be satisfactorily instructed as to "reasonable doubt."
James Carroll
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INVOLUNTARY EXPATRIATION
-SPECIFIC INTENT TO RELINQUISH
CITIZENSHIP REQUIRED
Morris Louis Baker, born in 1905 in North Dakota and therefore an
American citizen,' was taken to Canada as an infant in 1906. He re-
68. The Court's ruling as to the fifth amendment privilege not discussed in this
case note, will probably have a more devastating effect on federal marijuana control
than will its ruling as to the presumption. Although only subsection 26 U.S.C.
§ 4744 (a)(2) (1964) of the Marijuana Tax Act was invalidated, there is a strong
likelihood that the entire Act is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the fifth
amendment. See, e.g., Santos v. United States, 417 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1969); contra,
Buie v. United States, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1969).
69. Supra note 45, at 54.
1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
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